Mst Taposhi Rabeya: A law designed to protect society should never become a source of fear for the people it serves. Yet the power of arrest without a warrant under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, raises an uncomfortable question in Bangladesh: when the police can take away a person's liberty, who ensures that the power is exercised lawfully?

The answer cannot simply be that the law authorizes it. Police need the power to arrest without a warrant in certain circumstances. Requiring a warrant in every case could obstruct urgent investigations and allow suspected offenders to escape. But the necessity of that power does not justify unrestricted discretion. The real danger is not warrantless arrest itself; it is warrantless arrest without meaningful accountability.

Suspicion is often the starting point of an investigation. It should not become a substitute for the legal grounds required to deprive someone of liberty. An arrest can damage a person's reputation, disrupt family life and expose them to further risks even if no charge is ultimately established. The burden of preventing arbitrary arrest must therefore fall primarily on the authorities exercising that power, not on citizens forced to challenge it afterwards.

Bangladesh's courts have long recognized this concern. In Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) v. Bangladesh, reported in 55 DLR (HCD) 363, the High Court Division examined the misuse of arrest under Section 54 and detention under Section 167. Its directions sought to restrain arbitrary arrests and ensure that requests for police custody received proper judicial scrutiny. The Appellate Division subsequently considered the matter and issued further directions concerning law-enforcement agencies.

The significance of the BLAST litigation extends beyond the interpretation of two statutory provisions. It reflects a fundamental constitutional principle: the existence of police power does not make every exercise of that power lawful. Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Constitution protect lawful treatment, personal liberty and safeguards concerning arrest and detention. These protections must constrain police action in practice, not merely appear in legal texts.

The uncomfortable question is whether judicial safeguards can achieve their purpose when implementation is inadequate. A judgment may establish the correct legal principle, but its practical value depends on whether police officers follow it, Magistrates independently scrutinise arrests and violations produce meaningful consequences. Repeating safeguards in judgments and legislation cannot, by itself, guarantee that citizens are protected.

Recent legal reform makes this question even more important. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2026, introduced changes to the arrest framework, including provisions concerning the grounds for arrest, communication of those grounds and judicial examination of compliance. These changes offer an opportunity to strengthen accountability. But a written explanation is not necessarily a lawful explanation, and a procedural record is not proof that the decision was justified.

The decisive issue is enforcement. Magistrates must examine the actual grounds for arrest rather than accept police assertions automatically. Requests for police custody under Section 167 must be assessed on their individual merits, with reasons and relevant materials carefully considered. Allegations of custodial abuse require credible investigation, and proven violations must carry consequences. Otherwise, procedural safeguards risk becoming paperwork that protects the appearance of legality without protecting liberty itself.

None of this requires weakening legitimate law enforcement. On the contrary, accountable policing strengthens public confidence and the legitimacy of criminal investigations. A system that respects constitutional limits is not less capable of enforcing the law; it is better equipped to distinguish lawful authority from arbitrary coercion.

The line Section 54 must draw is clear: police should retain the authority necessary to investigate crime, but every arrest must have a lawful basis and remain open to meaningful scrutiny. No person should have to depend on an officer's goodwill to enjoy a constitutional right.

The ultimate test of the rule of law is not how much power the state possesses, but how effectively it restrains that power. Section 54 should empower the police to enforce the law-not empower them to stand beyond its reach.

Student, Bangladesh University of Professional